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Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War 
Order. London: MIT Press, 2015, 220 pp., ISBN: 978-0-262-02904-9, £17.95 (cloth). 
 
Reviewed by Gregory Schwartz, University of Bristol 
 
The period following the Russian annexation of Crimea and support for the armed 
separatists in the Donbas saw a flourishing of news reports, documentaries, articles and 
essays. A number of monographs, mainly journalistic but some from seasoned academics 
and policy analysts, have also appeared, some completed only months after the events on 
the Kyiv Maidan. The present book, finished just six months after Yanoukovich’s desertion 
and on the heels of both the massacre of the Ukrainian forces at Ilovaisk and the NATO 
summit in Wales, is one such volume. 
Despite my circumspection regarding the possibility of a rigorous analysis being produced in 
such a short timeframe by non-specialists on Ukraine, the book delivered on many fronts. 
To explain what sort of book it is, it may be best to begin by asking what sort of book it is 
not. It is not a treatise on the changing global order. It does not rely on any visible 
theoretical frame of reference or advance a contribution to a theory. Furthermore, it does 
not contain primary research, such as interviews or survey data—its primary sources of 
information are news articles, publicly available reports and existing historical monographs. 
There is little novelty in the authors’ account of the political, economic and social changes in 
Ukraine over the last quarter century for those who have studied it. Politics is dealt with at 
the level of leaders or states, and there is a conspicuous absence of the power of capital, 
the role of international institutions in influencing social change, and the global division of 
labour which could discernibly function as sources of international competition, crises and 
conflicts. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, however, it is a thoroughly enjoyable read. It is 
sufficiently concise and lucidly written to be a very useful guide for both the thinking public 
and those academics who want to understand the recent events in Ukraine in their 
geopolitical context. For readers in Europe and North America its insightful, if synoptic, 
overview of the events in Ukraine will also furnish some clues about the consequences of 
such events on political developments in their own countries. 
Conflict in Ukraine has a simple and logical structure, allowing the narrative to form a 
coherent whole. The first two chapters provide an extended sketch of Ukraine’s past and 
recent history, and an examination of the events leading up to the crisis of February-March 
2014. These are followed by a detailed discussion of Russia’s exploitation of the crisis 
internationally and domestically, and an extended, well-informed reflection on the 
European responses. After demonstrating that the crisis was a tragedy long in the making 
(and pointing to a variety of domestic and international contributing factors), the book 
brings it all together in a chapter that considers Ukraine’s future in light of the ongoing war 
and the changed global situation that it has brought about.  
Analytically and empirically, Conflict in Ukraine displays important strengths. For example, 
though admitting they lean heavily upon existing historical scholarship, Menon and Rumer’s 
summary of the nation’s history is robust. Laudably, they do not fall into the common trap 
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of Russophile historiography—a trap as ubiquitous as it is consequential. As Paul Robert 
Magocsi (1996) has argued, most of what is taught in European and American universities 
about eastern Europe beyond Poland comes, either directly or indirectly, from the Russian 
histories that were undergirded by an imperial narrative (stretching at least as far back as 
the Romanovs’ ascent to the throne of Muscovy) of the oneness of the Russian (Russkije) 
people, including present-day Ukrainians and Belarusians, with its historical centre in Kyiv. 
The acceptance of such historiographies at face value in the West may be seen in the failure 
of the Versailles agreements to grant national sovereignty to Ukraine when Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were carved 
out of the defeated or departed European empires. The self-proclaimed Ukrainian and 
Western Ukrainian People’s Republics had to fend for themselves against expansionist 
Poland and Romania, on the one hand, and the Red Army advancing the revolution over the 
territory of the former Russian Empire, on the other. The historical narrative that followed 
the spread of Soviet power in Ukraine (east of Halyczyna and Volyn’) stunted the national 
awakening, and represented the Ukrainians and the Litvins (an ethnonym of present-day 
Belarusians) in an amalgamated land of Soviet Socialist Republics as constituents of the 
tripartite Russian people, with a reconfiguration of characters, places and events now 
serving a Stalinist imperium. The current aggressive re-narration of the Russian experience 
by Kremlin propaganda sees Ukrainians as part of the Russian people and their separation a 
crime committed in 1991 by opportunist politicians. 
Yet, paradoxically, it was the Soviets that assembled all of the Ukrainian lands into its 
current form and established ethnic near-homogeneity in both Ukraine and its western 
neighbours after WWII. It was also during Soviet rule that Ukraine became an industrial and 
urban powerhouse, its economy on the eve of the USSR’s collapse outpacing that of 
neighbouring Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yet the Soviet narrative and practice of Ukrainian 
nationhood was always Stalinist in content, peasant-folkloric in form and fervently anti-
nationalist in practice. As this book shows in a roundabout way, this has remained more or 
less unchanged during most of the independence period—Ukraine stumbled into 
independence under the leadership of the Republic’s Communist Party bosses who 
imagined that an independent Ukraine had better chances recovering from the deep 
economic crisis affecting the late Soviet system. The focus shifted to profiting from the 
country’s resources and from its remaining industrial capacity, while marginalising the 
cultural intelligentsia who had led the call for independence in the last five years of the 
USSR. Despite the symbolism of an independent Ukraine, little serious work regarding 
national-democratic polity or institution-building took place. Intellectuals and politicians 
from the western regions (which entered the Ukrainian fold after WWII) seemed to be more 
visibly concerned about the national project, but the lack of interest from the political elites 
in Kiev and the primacy of the economy ensured that the national project was enveloped in 
the debates and imaginaries of the early twentieth century and, accordingly, seemed to 
attract more right-wing nationalists. This gave the opportunity for politicians like 
Yanoukovich—whose base was made up of raw materials exporters that stood to lose from 
either closer ties with the UE or a full subordination to Russia—to exploit regional 
differences and poison relations between ordinary Ukrainians who faced the same problems 
of yawning inequality, lack of economic opportunities and a sense of injustice.  
Key to Menon and Rumer’s explanation of Ukraine’s unwinding, which created an 
irreparable crisis and sealed Yanoukovich’s fate on the eve of the Maidan, was the country’s 
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reliance upon Russian gas and on the Russian market for its exports, as well as the 
government’s supposed lack of adherence to market principles and ‘excessive social 
spending’. This is a puzzling claim, for Ukraine’s reliance on Russian gas was no greater than 
that of Germany or Italy, and less (in relative terms) than that of Slovakia and Hungary. Its 
exports to Russia were half of its exports to the EU, and with about two-thirds of these 
being semi-finished metals, gas turbines and railway freight cars, Ukraine could have gone 
either way in its export orientation. Its social expenditures were miserly not only by EU but 
even by post-Soviet states’ standards, and its infrastructure had received virtually no 
upgrading in a quarter century. The real problems, which made it appear to millions of 
Ukrainians that only the EU could save the country, were the oligarchic economic structure, 
chronic under-funding of the state and the pillaging of state budgets by civil servants via 
corruption schemes, the use of state assets as a vehicle for personal gain, non-payment of 
corporate tax, the movement of vast sums off-shore, and the endemic failure of law 
enforcement.  
Another of my frustrations with Conflict in Ukraine is that the authors take Russia’s stated 
international concerns at face value. Richard Sakwa, in a recent review, chastises Menon 
and Rumer for not dedicating more space to the role of the US and the EU in failing to heed 
Russia’s ‘legitimate interests’ in its sphere of influence. By moving NATO and EU’s 
institutions to its borders, on the one hand, and by promoting liberal democratic ‘value 
changes’ in these countries, such as via the Eastern Partnership programme, on the other, 
the West has alienated Russia and made her more revanchist. (In his own book, Frontline 
Ukraine, Sakwa paints Putin as the most Europhile Russian leader and argues that, 
ultimately, Russia’s hand in Ukraine was forced by the actions of the West. Russia, according 
to Sakwa, is seeking a pluralistic and multipolar ‘Greater Europe’ which would include 
Russia, versus the EU’s unilateral ‘Wider Europe’ that is suspicious of Russia.) In fact, Menon 
and Rumer concede quite a lot to Russia and provide sufficient criticism of the EU and the 
US. Their method differs from Sakwa’s in that it is tempered by a realpolitik warning of the 
consequences of extending ‘European values’ too far to the East, lest this garner a reaction 
from a more powerful neighbour. They suggest that Ukraine should not be accepted into 
NATO, given that it is too likely to be attacked, and recommend diplomacy against other 
options for dealing with the Kremlin to avoid creating a sense of besiegement. 
But here is where the authors, and others in the pro-Kremlin camp, err. They take at face 
value the idea that a country has ‘legitimate’ interests over other nations’ fate; that Russia is 
pursuing a ‘multipolar’ world order out of a sense of justice; or that it has the power on the 
international arena to do so. In reality, in the current international legal environment, Russia 
does not have ‘legitimate interests’ beyond its own sovereign borders and outside the 
legally binding agreements to which it is a party (many of which it has broken and continues 
to defy). More importantly, the authorities in the Kremlin have been facing, since at least 
2009, a political and economic crisis which leaves the vast majority of its people in stark 
poverty and without any recourse to the rule of law and justice, while a small group of 
Kremlin vassals and their hangers-on at different regional levels are taking whatever power 
and resources they can into their own hands (and usually exporting the proceeds abroad). 
Against this background, a set of diversionary tactics for the domestic audience provides a 
better explanation of the Russian leaders’ actions: a small victorious war; the denigration of 
Russia’s neighbours to make it appear powerful; posturing without commitment on the 
international stage to appear resolute and to give the people the sense of strength despite 
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their actual impotence; the witch-hunt and persecution of anybody who may think or act 
outside these boundaries; and the general projection of the omnipotence of the state and 
its leader. Despite highlighting Russia’s ostensible ‘point of view’, Menon and Rumer fail to 
‘see like a state’—i.e. to consider the state’s action as the nodal expression of class rule over 
a particular domain.  
In fact, the EU did regard Ukraine as part of Russia’s ‘legitimate sphere of influence’. Rather 
than providing incentives for the Ukrainian leadership to pursue the kinds of reforms that 
were rewarded in Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary and others, it was 
content to make half-hearted pronouncements and empty promises so as not to jeopardise 
access to the Russian markets for EU goods, to satisfy its insatiable appetite for Russia’s 
hydrocarbons, and to benefit from the billions of dollars of ill-gotten Russian money 
deposited in European banks or invested in expensive property. The EU’s political 
establishment has done little to avoid the crisis in Ukraine, because, in the early 21st, as in 
the early 20th century, Ukraine has not been considered a nation worthy of international 
solidarity and continues to be treated as ‘borderland’.  
For progressive Europeans, therefore, the national question in Ukraine remains of 
paramount importance. Thankfully Menon and Rumer’s account goes some way to 
imparting greater appreciation of this fact.  
